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ABSTRACT 
 
We study how different rules for allocating litigation costs impact on royalty 
negotiation when a non-practicing patent holder asserts its patent against a product 
developer.  
A theoretical framework is proposed which distinguishes between three legal cost 
allocation systems: the American system, where each party bears its own costs, the 
British system, where the loser incurs all costs, and the system favoring the 
defendant, where the defendant pays its own costs if it loses and nothing otherwise. 
The model considers both flat lawyer fees and contingency fees.  
We first determine conditions under which, in the assumed contexts, the American 
system is preferable to the British one. Successively, we show that the less usual 
system favoring the defendant proves to be an interesting alternative. 
In this way, in addition to extend the standard model of patent hold-up, we furnish an 
analytical treatment of recent legislative proposals, such as the Saving High-Tech 
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, patent hold-up seems to become a primary concern for innovating 
firms in component-driven industries. In these sectors, notably information 
technology where products comprise thousand of separately patentable components, 
many patent-assertion entities (also known as non-practicing entities or, in a 
pejorative term, “patent trolls”) engage in deliberate tactics allowing them to take 
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product developers by surprise once they have made irreversible investments. 
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Shapiro, 2010; Bessen and Meurer, 2014; Sichelman, 
2010). As Shapiro (2010. p. 290) points out, a typical situation involves independent 
invention: an unexploited patent is asserted against a producer who has already begun 
using the underlying technology being entirely unaware of the patent. Because of the 
prohibitive costs associated with redesigning a non infringing version of the product, 
the surprised developer will usually accept to pay royalties far above the intrinsic 
value of the protected invention (Lemley, 2008, p. 613). The settlement of 612.5 
million dollars between BlackBerry-maker RIM and NTP (a patent asserting entity) is 
perhaps the most notorious worldwide example of this “trolling activity”.1 As for 
Europe, a relevant case involved Nokia, HTC Corp., T-Mobile GmbH and Apple sued 
by the German based non-practicing company IPCom GmBH. 
It seems clear that in this kind of scenario the hold-up problem can be completely 
overcome only if the bargaining disadvantage due to the redesign costs that burden 
producers is nullified. According to Lemley and Shapiro (2007), this goal could be 
achieved if the courts routinely denied permanent injunctions –using instead ongoing 
royalty remedies– in patent litigation cases where patent-assertion entities are 
involved and the infringing feature is only a little component of a complex product.2 
Effectively, after the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
decision the U.S. district courts have become much more reluctant than before to 
grant permanent injunctions when the patent holder does not compete against the 
downstream firm (Boyle, 2012; Chien and Lemley, 2013).3 But, as Chien and Lemley 
(2013, p. 2) note, “the Court’s ruling didn’t eliminate injunction-based holdup 
because another jurisdiction routinely grants injunctions in patent cases: the 
International Trade Commission”. 
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 With regard to this case Bessen and Meurer (2008, p. 49) report that “RIM first learned 
about NTP and Campana’s patents in early 2000 when NTP sent letters to several companies, 
including RIM, warning them about NTP’s wireless e-mail patents. This was ten years after 
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invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the 
threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages 
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the 
public interest” Shapiro (2010, p. 282).The Justice Kennedy’s opinion supported by Lemley 
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Elhauge (2008). For some responses see Shapiro (2010). 
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 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchang the supreme court stated that to obtain an injunction the 
plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction”. These requirements 
have made it more difficult for non practicing entities to obtain injunctions in district courts. 
However, research entities, such as universities, or individual patent holders that evidently are 
not patent trolls still seems to be entitled to obtain injunctive relief (Boyle, 2012; Chien and 
Lemley, 2012). 
  
On the other hand, the tendency to consider injunctive relief as the norm, typical 
of many European countries,4 seems to be confirmed in the EU by the Agreement on 
a Unified Patent Court (UPC). The risk that the effects of an EU-wide injunction 
would be a strong incentive for “trolling activities”, so far not so common in the EU 
as in the US, was made plain by an open letter to the EU legislative authorities signed 
by sixteen leading firms or organizations. In particular, the letter, published on 
September 26, 2013 in the New York Times,5 expresses concern that: 
 
 “Rigid application of an injunction rule could enable unprincipled 
litigants to ‘hold up’ manufacturers by making unreasonable royalty 
demands for even a single trivial patent on a complex product.... This 
will be particularly true with injunctions under the UPC because the 
UPC injunction power will extend beyond a single country to most of 
Europe…Indeed, PAEs (patent assertion entities) have already begun to 
set up shop in several European countries, drawn by the potential for 
siphoning more revenue from European companies”. 
 
As some commentators note, it may be that to take account of these criticisms the 
UPC Preparatory Committee will introduce some corrective measures.6 But, given the 
previous consideration for permanent injunctions, it seems very unlikely that a 
remedy similar to the US Supreme Court’s decision in eBay will be implemented. 
Summing up, it must be acknowledged that both in the US and Europe practical 
and ideological obstacles make it difficult to fully counteract “patent trolling” 
activities on the basis of the Lemley and Shapiro’s proposal. Perhaps a more viable, 
although partial, remedy can be found through legislative actions on litigation costs.7 
Since the rule for allocating litigation costs adopted by the courts affects the parties 
bargaining power in finding a licensing agreement, an appropriate choice between the 
available alternatives may introduce a restraint on the patent holders’ claims. In this 
paper we explore this possibility. 
To our knowledge, although some papers exist that discuss the role of legal-cost 
allocation in favoring patent litigation or settlement (Meurer, 1989; Aoki and Hu, 
1999; Llobet, 2002; Llobet and Suarez, 2011), and many more have dealt with the 
problem by referring to civil suits in general (Shavell, 1982; Bebchuk, 1984; 
Braeutigam et al. 1984; Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Hylton, 1993, Hughes and 
Snyder, 1995, to cite a few of the early works), only little attention had been paid to 
the implications on the royalty-bargaining process. A notable exception is Aoki and 
Hu (1999), where the issue is analyzed distinguishing between legal systems 
depending on their degree of patent protection.8 Here we adopt a different point of 
view, that is we assume that if a patent is declared invalid or not infringed this is 
because, after a thorough scrutiny, the court shows that truly the invention at issue 
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 According to Bessen and Love (2013, p. 86), “in addition to litigation-oriented 
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 Farrell and Shapiro (2008, p. 1354) point out that “their approach assumes that if a 
patent is ruled invalid or not infringed it is a court (or legal system) error”. 
  
does not meet the novelty and non-obviousness requirements or the patent claims are 
so narrow as not to concern the feature under investigation (Farrell and Shapiro, 
2008). This allows us to treat patent hold-up as a real problem, and to study how 
different rules of legal-cost allocation impact on it. 
Specifically, we will compare the patent holder’s payoff from pre-trial licensing 
agreements under three different systems for allocating litigation costs, namely, the 
“American system”, where each party bears its own costs; the “British system”, 
where the loser incurs all costs; and the “system favoring the defendant”, where the 
defendant pays its own costs if it loses and nothing otherwise9 −as provided for by the 
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act recently 
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. The comparison is performed within 
the hold-up model by Lemley and Shapiro (2007) and Shapiro (2010). 
 
 
ROYALTY NEGOTIATION 
 
Shapiro’s (2010) model refers to an environment where a non-practicing patent holder 
owns a patent protecting a technological feature which allows increasing the value to 
consumers of a downstream firm’s product by an amount 0≥v  in comparison with 
the best non-infringing alternative. The quantity vX , where X  denotes the number 
of units sold by the downstream firm, is referred to as the “value of the patented 
technology”. Although a non-infringing alternative exists, when the downstream firm 
has already incorporated the patented technology into its product, redesigning it to 
avoid using the patented technology entails a cost H , including any profits lost while 
redesigning.10 
The two parties assign the same probability 1<θ
 
−called “patent strength”− to 
the event that, if litigated in court, the patent will be ruled valid and infringed. If the 
parties resort to a lawsuit and the patent holder wins, then it will be entitled to obtain 
a permanent injunction and damages for infringement on the basis of a “reasonable 
royalty” rate s . In any case, litigation in court can be avoided by negotiating a 
royalty r  per unit product incorporating the patented feature sold by the downstream 
firm. This licensing negotiation is modeled as a Nash Bargaining game, where the 
patent holder captures the fraction β  −reflecting the patent holder’s bargaining skill− 
of the joint gains from settling rather than litigating.  
Shapiro (2010, p. 309-312) shows that under the above assumptions, the parties 
will reach a pre-trial licensing agreement implying 
 
                             PD EEHXTvsTrX )1()]1([ ββθββθ −−++−+=                      (1) 
 
where 1<T  stands for the duration of a typical patent lawsuit as a fraction of the 
remaining lifetime of the patent, while PE  and DE  denote the litigation costs that the 
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 The label of “system favoring the defendant” applied to this allocation rule is due to 
Shavell (1982). In the literature this fee-shifting rule is also known as a case of “one-way fee-
shifting” in contrast with the “two-way fee-shifting” provided for by the British rule. 
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 As Denicolò et al. (2008, p. 580) note, “Lemley and Shapiro distinguish between direct 
costs of redesigning and lost profits. This allows for a richer set of predictions, but 
complicates the analysis. Merging the two components of the cost into a single index 
simplifies matters without altering the logic of the argument”. 
  
patent holder and the downstream firm, respectively, expect to bear if negotiation 
fails.11 
With respect to the reasonable royalty rate s , two possibilities can be considered. 
The first consists in assuming that the court sets it at its benchmark level, defined as 
the level that would be negotiated if the downstream firm before designing its product 
were aware of the patent and the patent were known to be valid and infringed 
(Shapiro, 2010, p. 290).  In this case we have vs β=  and Eq. (1) reduces to 
 
                                       PD EEHvXrX )1( ββθβθβ −−++=                                  (2) 
 
Alternatively, as we will see in Section 4 below, the reasonable royalty rate can 
be determined endogenously in a self-fulfilling equilibrium (Shapiro, 2010, p. 301). 
As for the case vs β= , Eq. (2) tells us that the patent holder’s payoff, rX , 
depends upon three components (Shapiro, 2010, p. 295). The first term in the right-
hand side of the equation, vXθβ ,  can be viewed as the benchmark level of the patent 
holder’s payoff, that is the payoff that would accrue to the patent holder if, apart from 
the bargaining skills, the two parties were on equal footing in the negotiation. The 
second term, Hθβ , reflects the patent holder’s ability to hold-up the downstream firm 
based on direct costs and lost profits associated with redesigning the product. The 
third term, PD β)E(βE −− 1 , measures the patent holder’s bargaining advantage 
(disadvantage) associated with the costs of failure to reach a licensing agreement. 
In what follows we study the role of different rules for allocating litigation costs 
in limiting (or enhancing) the departure of the patent holder’s payoff from its 
benchmark level. 
 
 
AMERICAN VS. BRITISH SYSTEM 
 
Flat lawyer fees 
 
Consider first the American system, where each party bears its own litigation costs, 
assumed identical and equal to the flat lawyer fee C , whatever the trial’s outcome. In 
this case CEE PD == , so that Eq. (2) can be written 
 
                                             CHvXrX )12( −+=− βθβθβ                                      (3) 
 
Unlike the American system, the British one envisages that the loser in court will 
bear all litigation costs. In this case, CED θ2=  and CEP )1(2 θ−= , implying that 
 
                                          CHvXrX )1(2 −++=− θβθβθβ                                    (4) 
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 To be precise, two further assumptions are required. First, and obviously, litigation 
costs expected by the patent holder must be small enough to make the patent holder’s threat to 
sue credible and litigation costs expected by the downstream firm must be small enough to 
make it litigate rather than exiting. Second, in the case of litigation the downstream firm must 
find it not profitable to develop a non-infringing version of its product during the trial 
(Shapiro, 2010, p. 292). 
  
 
By comparing Eqs. (3) and (4), we can immediately deduce the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that the two parties’ litigation costs are identical and equal to 
the flat lawyer fee C. Then, when βθ=s , under the American system the departure 
of the patent holder’s payoff from its benchmark level, ,vXrX θβ−  is greater than it 
is under the British system for all patent strengths θ  less than 5.0 . When 5.0>θ  the 
above statement is reversed. 
 
Thus, for relatively weak patents the British rule proves more effective in limiting 
patent hold-up. This is because, by charging the loser with the entire litigation costs, 
for a relatively weak patent the British rule puts the downstream firm in a better 
bargaining position than it would enjoy in the American system. More specifically, 
when the parties have equal bargaining skill and equal litigation costs, under the 
American rule litigation costs are neutral, that is they do not affect the parties’ 
bargaining positions. So, the patent holder can appropriate all fruits of its ability to 
hold-up the downstream firm based on the cost of redesigning the product. By 
contrast, under the British rule litigation costs are not neutral, that is they positively 
affect the downstream firm’s bargaining position, and the patent holder’s ability to 
hold-up it is (partially or totally) offset. 
Things are drastically different when the patent at issue is relatively strong, that is 
when 5.0>θ . In this case, the rule that charges the loser with all litigation costs 
plays in favor of the patent holder. In particular, when the parties have the same 
bargaining skill and the same litigation costs, under the American rule the departure 
of patent holder’s payoff from its benchmark level is equal to the hold-up components 
due to redesign lags and costs, while under the British rule the departure is greater 
than this term. 
 
Contingency fees 
 
The model can be extended to take into account contingency-fee arrangements, where 
lawyer fees are determined by the success of the claim, and are usually calculated as a 
percentage of the client’s recovery: a “no win, no fee” arrangement to which patent-
assertion entities increasingly turned in recent time (Towns, 2010; Schwartz, 2012; 
Chien and Guo, 2013). A typical contingency-fee arrangement provides for both the 
reimbursement of the case costs incurred by the lawyer and, in case of success, a 
lawyer fee Rα , calculated as a percentage α of the recovery R . Nevertheless, to our 
purpose the case costs play no significant role, and we ignore them. Then, since an 
alleged infringing producer lacks comparable risk-spreading options,12 when a patent 
holder is turning to a contingency-fee lawyer expected litigation costs under the 
American system become CED =  and REP θα= , implying that the departure of the 
patent holder’s payoff from its benchmark level will amount to 
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                                        RCHvXrX θαββθβθβ )1( −−+=−                                 (5) 
 
In turn, under the British system expected litigation costs amount to 
)( RCED αθ +=  and CEP )1( θ−= , so that 
 
                                    RCHvXrX βθαθβθβθβ +−++=− )1(                             (6) 
 
Eqs. (5) and (6) immediately lead to 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the patent holder turns to a contingency-fee lawyer. 
Then, when vs β= ,  under the American system the departure of the patent holder's 
payoff from its benchmark level is smaller than it is under the British system for all 
patent strengths θ  such that CR /)1( θαθ <− . 
 
So, if lawyers are willing to propose contingency fees only if the expected 
earning from the deal is not lower than what expected from the flat fee C , that is they 
do not sign agreements providing for a percentage α  such that CR <θα , differently 
from what happens with flat lawyer fees the American system proves preferable even 
when patents are relatively weak.13 This sharp difference is due to the fact that with 
contingency lawyer fees, under the British system patent holders face expected 
litigation costs that are half of what they are with flat lawyer fees. As a consequence, 
the effect of litigation costs on the patent holder’s payoff remains positive whatever 
the patent strength, while under a flat fee arrangement for 5.0<θ  it becomes 
negative.14 
 
THE SYSTEM FAVORING THE DEFENDANT 
 
Considering the difficulty in deciding, at least under flat lawyer fees, which of the 
two “normal” rules, American or British, performs better in the presence of hold-up, 
it seems useful to explore the merits of a much less usual system for allocating 
litigation costs, namely the system favoring the defendant.15 Actually, as suggested by 
its own label, this system seems more effective than the British system in limiting the 
patent holder’s bargaining power (and a fortiori more effective than the American 
one) when the patent is relatively weak, and correspondingly it is more effective than 
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 This can be easily seen by observing that if the inequality CR <θα  cannot hold the 
necessary and sufficient condition CR /)1( θαθ <−  can be replaced by the sufficient 
condition 1)1( <− θ , which is fulfilled for all relevant θ . 
14
 Given the increasing availability in the US of patent lawyers willing to work on 
contingency fees, the above result casts some doubt on legislation proposals such as the Patent 
Litigation Integrity Act introduced to the US Senate on October 30, 2013, and the Innovation 
Act passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on December 5, 2013, but taken off the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on May 21, 2014. Both bills envisage a British fee-shifting rule 
for patent lawsuits. 
15
 We do not consider the symmetrically opposed system favoring the plaintiff because it 
obviously enhances the patent holder’s bargaining position with respect to both the American 
and British systems, so exacerbating the hold-up problem. 
  
the American system (and a fortiori more than the British one) when the patent is 
relatively strong.  
The strong discordance between the apparent merits of the system favoring the 
defendant and its unusual adoption in the real world requires a specification. As 
Shavell noted, despite the system favoring the defendant can be considered as a 
departure from the norm (the American system in the U.S. and the British system in 
Europe), it has been sometimes employed: for example, the state of Florida has 
adopted it in medical malpractice cases (Shavell, 1982, p. 55-56). But much more 
important from our point of view is the fact that this allocation rule has been recently 
perceived as a −at least partial− remedy to some opportunistic behavior in patent 
disputes. This is proven by the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal 
Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013 −introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives to 
modify chapter 29 of title 35 United States Code− which provides for the recovery of 
defendant’s litigation costs in some cases where non-practicing entities are involved. 
Precisely, the bill states that: 
 
“Notwithstanding section 285, the Court shall award the recovery of full 
costs to any prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement, 
including reasonable attorney’s fees, other than the United States, upon 
the entry of a final judgment if the court determines that the adverse 
party did not meet at least one of the conditions described in subsection 
(d), unless the court finds that exceptional circumstances make an award 
unjust”.16 
 
With respect to the party alleging infringement, conditions described in 
subsection (d) exclude original inventors, practicing patent holders, universities, and 
technology transfer organizations. This makes clear the proponents' intention to curb 
the trolling activities of entities that purchases dormant patents for the sole purpose of 
asserting them against producers. In any case, the SHIELD Act seems a very 
important attempt to apply the rule favoring the defendant, so making it something 
very different from a mere theoretical curiosity. 
 
Flat lawyer fees 
 
Since the system favoring the defendant envisages that the downstream firm does not 
pay litigation costs if it wins in court and only its own costs if it loses, with flat 
lawyer fees the parties’ expected litigation costs are given by 
CCCEP )2()1(2 θθθ −=+−=  and CED θ= , respectively, implying that  
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 The bill’s proponents are Representatives Peter DeFazio (D-Oregon) and Jason 
Chaffetz (R-Utah). The text is available at http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/SHIELD-Act-113th-final.pdf. A first version of the SHIELD Act, 
available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/SHIELD_ACT_0.pdf, has been criticized on 
the ground that (1) its applicability was limited to software patents, (2) there were a generic 
reference to a court’s determination that the party alleging the infringement of the patent did 
not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, and (3) it did not distinguished between 
practicing and non-practicing patent holders (Yeh, 2012; Chen, 2013). The current version of 
the bill overcomes these criticisms. 
  
                                         CHvXrX )]1(2[ βθθβθβ −−+=−                                   (7) 
 
The following proposition can be immediately proven. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that two the parties’ litigation costs are identical and equal to 
the flat lawyer fee C . Then, when vs β= , under the system favoring the defendant 
the departure of the patent holder’s payoff from its benchmark level is smaller than 
the hold-up component Hθβ  for all patent strengths θ  less than )1(2 β− . If the 
parties have the same bargaining skill the statement holds for all relevant patent 
strengths. 
 
So, if the parties have equal bargaining skill the system favoring the defendant 
extends the property shown by the British system for weak patents to all patent 
strengths, that is it exhibits all the merits of the British system without its flaws. Also, 
we can show that with respect to the American rule the system favoring the defendant 
could reduce the patent holders’ ability to extract royalties by a substantial amount.  
To this purpose, consider the case where the ratios of redesign costs and individual 
litigation costs to the total value of the patented feature amount to %50  and %10 , 
respectively, and the two parties have the same bargaining skill, that is 5.0/ =vXH , 
1.0/ =vXC  and 5.0=β .17 With these numerical values, Eqs. (2) and (3) imply that 
under the American rule we have 5.0/)( =− vvr θβθβ  for all relevant θ : since the 
parties have equal bargaining skill, the effect of litigation costs is null whatever the 
patent strength. In turn, Eqs. (2) and (7) say that under the system favoring the 
defendant θθβθβ /2.07.0/)( −=− vvr , that is the percentage departure of the 
negotiated royalty rate from its benchmark level approaches 5.0  as θ  approaches 1 
and it decreases toward zero as θ  decreases toward 28.0 . In particular, for a patent 
whose probability of being declared valid and infringed in court is 5.0 , the 
percentage departure amounts to 3.0  −a reduction of %40  with respect to the 
corresponding departure under the American system. 
 
Contingency fees 
 
If the patent holder and the lawyer sign a contingency fee agreement, expected 
litigation costs are given by CED θ=  and RCEP θαθ +−= )1( , so that 
 
                                RCHvXrX θαββθθβθβ )1()1( −−−++=−                           (8) 
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that in case of litigation the patent holder would turn to a 
contingency-fee lawyer. Then, when vs β= , under the system favoring the defendant 
the departure of the patent holder’s payoff from its benchmark level is smaller than 
the hold-up component Hθβ  for all patent strengths θ  such that 
CRC /))(1( θαβθ +−< . 
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 Obviously, with respect to the American rule (and the British rule), the system favoring 
the defendant reduces the patent-holder's bargaining power for all relevant values of the 
parameters (compare Eqs. (3), (4) and (7)).The numerical example is only meant to show how 
relevant can be this effect. 
  
 
Proposition 4 reproduces the statement in Proposition 3 with a slight difference in 
the condition regarding θ . If the two parties have equal bargaining skill and 
contingency-fee lawyers do not sign agreements providing for a percentage α  such 
that CR <θα , the statement holds for all relevant patent strengths. Obviously, this 
means that the system favoring the defendant, unlike the British system, is not 
significantly sensitive to the two different types of lawyer-fee arrangement. 
 
 
REASONABLE ROYALTIES IN SELF-FULFILLING EQUILIBRIUM 
 
The assumption that reasonable royalties are set at their benchmark level can be 
questioned on the ground that it may be very difficult to estimate vβ  with accuracy. 
As a matter of fact, in setting s the courts resort to certain practical criteria that 
necessarily introduce some degree of circularity: for example, if in their calculation 
the courts use as proxies the royalties actually negotiated for other comparable 
patents, the determined reasonable royalties will depend in part on themselves, since 
the royalties actually negotiated depend in part on what the courts decide. However, 
this circularity can be theoretically resolved by searching for a fulfilled-expectations 
equilibrium (Shapiro, 2010, p. 301 and Appendix). 
A fulfilled-expectations equilibrium requires that for a valid patent (i.e., 1=θ ) in 
Eq. (1) the equality sr =  holds. Then, solving for s we have 
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where *DE  and 
*
PE  denote expected litigation costs for 1=θ . Eq. (9) tells us that the 
reasonable royalty rate in self-fulfilling equilibrium contains itself a hold-up 
component )1(/ TXH −β  to be added to the benchmark level vβ  (Shapiro, 2010, p. 
301). Moreover, it is influenced by the rule of legal-cost allocation on which *DE  and  
*
PE  depend. 
Some algebra involving Eqs. (1) and (9) allows us to determine the patent 
holder’s payoff from initial negotiation when the reasonable royalties are in a self- 
fulfilling equilibrium and to compare the outcomes of the different systems of legal-
cost allocation. Since, limiting ourselves to the case of flat lawyer fees, the American 
rule implies CEEEE PDPD ====
**
, we can write the departure of the patent 
holder’s payoff from its benchmark level under this system as 
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In turn, the British rule entails CED θ2= , CEP )1(2 θ−= , CED 2* =  and 0* =PE , 
so that 
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By comparing Eqs. (10) and (11) the following proposition can be proven. 
 
Proposition 5. Suppose that two the parties’ litigation costs are identical and equal to 
the flat lawyer fee C . Then, when the reasonable royalty rate is determined in a self-
fulfilling equilibrium, under the American system the departure of the patent holder’s 
payoff from its benchmark level, ,vXrX θβ−  is greater than it is under the British 
system for all )2/()1( TT −−<θ . When )2/()1( TT −−>θ  the opposite occurs. 
 
If the duration of litigation as a fraction of the remaining patent life is small, that 
is if T  is small, the ratio )2/()1( TT −−  is close to 5.0 . In this case, Proposition 1, 
drawn under the assumption that the courts are able to set the reasonable royalty at 
their benchmark level, is substantially confirmed. But with T  increasing toward 
unity, the range of the patent strength over which the American system is preferable 
becomes gradually wider. 
The system favoring the defendant is less sensitive to the two different 
assumptions on reasonable royalties. In particular, the statement concerning the case 
where the two parties have the same bargaining skill in Proposition 3 is confirmed. 
This can be shown remembering that CED θ=  and CEP )2( θ−= , so CEE PD == ** , 
in which case the departure of the patent holder’s payoff from its benchmark level 
becomes 
 
                               
T
CTT
T
H
vXrX
−
+−−−
+
−
=−
1
)]1)(1(2[
1
θβθθβθβ                      (12) 
 
When 5.0=β  the second term in the right-hand side of Eq. (12) is negative for 
all relevant θ  and T . This allows us to write 
 
Proposition 6. Suppose that the two parties’ litigation costs are identical and equal to 
the flat lawyer fee C . Then, when the reasonable royalty rate is determined in a self-
fulfilling equilibrium and the parties have equal bargaining skill, the departure of the 
patent holder’s payoff from its benchmark level is smaller than the hold-up 
component )1/( TH −θβ  for all patent strengths 1<θ  and trial durations 1<T . 
 
Summing up, the only relevant difference with the case where the reasonable 
royalty rate is set at its benchmark level concerns the comparison between the 
American and the British systems when the duration of litigation relative to the 
remaining time-life of the patent is high. In these circumstance, if the reasonable 
royalty rate is set at its self-fulfilling equilibrium the American system becomes more 
attractive than the British one over a very wide range of the patent strength. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  
We studied how different systems for allocating litigation costs affect the patent 
holder’s payoff in the Shapiro’s (2010) model of patent hold-up. The American and 
British systems are compared. When in the case of litigation a contingency-fee 
arrangement between the patent holder and the lawyer would be signed, the American 
system proves to be more effective in counteracting the patent holder ability to hold-
up the downstream firm. When, instead, a flat-fee arrangement would be signed, we 
cannot decide which of the two systems behaves better in this respect. More 
specifically, when the patent at issue is relatively weak –in the sense that in court the 
patent would be deemed invalid or not infringed with a relatively high probability– 
the British system opposes the hold-up effects associated with injunctions: in this case 
it acts as a device reducing the patent holder’s bargaining advantage, while the 
American rule proves to be basically neutral. By contrast, if the patent is relatively 
strong the opposite is true: given its propensity to be neutral, the American system 
does not work in favor of the patent holder, as it is the case for the British system. 
These conflicting results have lead us to consider the possible merits of a less 
usual system for allocating litigation costs, namely the system favoring the defendant 
provided for by the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes 
(SHIELD) Act recently introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. This system 
shows promise in weakening the hold-up problem under both flat and contingency 
lawyer fees. 
The above results are obtained under the assumption that in calculating damages 
the courts are able to set reasonable royalties at a “natural” benchmark level. We also 
considered the case where the court-determined reasonable royalties are based on the 
actual royalties negotiated for other comparable patents. Limiting ourselves to the 
case of flat lawyer fees, we have seen that in a self-fulfilling equilibrium, unlike what 
occurs under “natural” reasonable royalties, the range of the patent strength over 
which the American system is preferable to the British one becomes gradually wider 
as the duration of a typical patent suit increases. On the contrary , the system favoring 
the defendant proves to be substantially insensitive to the two different assumptions 
on reasonable royalties. 
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